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1. A brief review of new theoretical developments
Over the last ten years or so demography has made considerable progress on the theoretical
front. Old theories have been modified or discarded and  new theories have emerged to explain either
phenomena not observed before or those that stubbornly resist reduction to conventionally accepted
theories. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. First, explanations of fertility changes were
traditionally fairly loose and imprecise. A case in point is the set of rather disconnected propositions that
drawn from the so-called demographic transition framework (Notestein, 1945). More tightness was
introduced through contributions by sociologists  as Caldwell (1982), Coale and Watkins (1986), 
Mason(1997), and Retherford (1985),  as well as economists as Becker (1960) and Easterlin and
Crimmins (1985) who, armed with utility maximization frameworks, lent more rigor though not
necessarily more truth, to theories of fertility change. The price paid for this extra amount of rigor was
high: for the last twenty years a rigid dichotomy prevailed in the field whereby a paradigm rooted in
economic calculus competes with a paradigm where individuals accomodate to social and cultural
constraints. However, as illustrated by a recent volume of the US National Academy of Science (1998)
such dichotomy is desintegrating as economic theories and corresponding models increasingly
incorporate social and cultural factors into the more conventional cost-benefit analysis with rational
actors. The new models attempt to explain behavior persistence and change as a function of both
individual economic calculations and accommodation to a social and cultural milieu. The models involve
complicated feedback mechanisms, and enable us to understand better the exogenous (and sometime
endogenous) impact of changes in policies (coordinating agents). Without exception, these models are
very demanding of  computing technology and empirical information.
Second, although the epidemiological literature on the spread of illnesses benefited very early
on from the insights of various deterministic and stochastic models, it remained somewhat stunted and
failed to yield the returns expected at the outset. Plagued with mathematical intractability and
informational demands that defied even the most ambitious data collection enterprise,  the sophisticated
machinery developed by Bailey (1975) or Bartholomew (1973), for example, was utilized only- page 3 -
minimally, if at all by demographers. It is only recently and mainly through the influential work by
Anderson and May (1991) that such models were revived, fine-tuned,  and implemented to answer
empirical questions. An example of this are applications  to understand the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Although these  models are still on the shelves of practitioners of demography, there is growing pressure
to use them on  issues  ranging from health and mortality to those regarding relations between events in
the life cycle of young adults (Billari, et al., 1999). A very promising avenue of investigation has been
pursued by Phillipson and colleagues who embark in an attempt to marry epidemiological models that
operate in a social and political vacuum with a utility maximization framework that enables them to
introduce rational actors, define mechanism through which their actions can have an impact on
aggregate dynamics and those through which aggregate properties of the system influences individual
decision making. These, as the aforementioned  models involving social interactions, allow feedback to
exist between individual decision-making and aggregate properties of the system and, therefore, must
face and solve issues related to possibly multiple equilibria.
Third, demographers and sociologists alike have been aware for a long time that some
outcomes in the life of individuals--age at marriage,  pregnancy, divorce, health status, retirement--are
closely connected not just to isolated events or with fixed characteristics acquired in the past,  but with
entire strings of events and with rapidly changing characteristics. We have even developed a term to
refer to this type of strings, namely, ‘ life cycle stages’. For example, we are now coming to the
realization that propensity to divorce may be linked to the kind of family  environment and peer groups
experienced during early adolescence, and even the propensity to divorce of parents themselves. In
social stratification there is a fair amount of research that shows that occupational status at one point in
time is a function of the entire past occupational career (as well as marital careers and educational
careers), namely, the sequence of status the individual occupied in the past. Similarly, the literature on
health status and mortality has produced convincing evidence showing that events in adult  life may be
traced to events that occurred earlier in life, even in utero (Barker, 1998). Finally, in criminology, a field
where demographers and economists have contributed a great deal, we have developed the notion of
‘criminal careers’ to understand persistent criminal behavior. This conceptualization enables us to- page 4 -
understand how a particular sequence of events in the past  locks individuals into a future path where
the likelihood of engaging in additional criminal behavior increases.
In all these examples, the key issue seems to be that it is the precise sequence of states that an
individual occupies in the past that is relevant for the occurrence (non-occurrence) of events in the
future. The study of such phenomena has proven to be quite hard in part because it requires richer data
than are commonly unavailable to us. But the difficulties also stem from the fact that this type of
approach demands well developed technical tools that most demographers do not know or do not care
to learn. An additional obstacle is that feasible and promising procedures are insufficiently developed
and have not yet diffused broadly enough in the research community nor have they  been tested
extensively. Multistate hazard models and sequence analyses are good examples. I will review both
below.
Fourth, there are a number of demographic phenomena that require an  understanding of how
individuals eventually match with each other in terms of some a priori defined resources. Marriage is a
prototypical example of a matching problem but so are the processes whereby individuals get jobs, or 
when entire households are involved in decision making about migration of some of their members, or 
when siblings and parents agree on particular forms of social, material and emotional support, the so-
called intra-family intergenerational transfers. Characteristic of all these examples is the existence of
some type of dynamic process which requires search and agreement by several actors, all of whom are
trying to maximize some sort of benefit in cooperation (competition) with others. Thus, it is not
surprising that game theoretical approaches and bargaining models have been brought to bear to
elucidate some of them. But the models are difficult, the literature is opaque to most demographers, and
the estimation procedures are  involved and computer intensive.
Fifth, and lastly, we have known for sometime that exogenous economic, social and cultural
changes lead to the transformation of families and households. However,  inferences about the
occurrence of such transformations from observable family or household configurations--and about the
relation between these changes and exogenous factors--are hampered by the simple fact that the same
exogenous factors that lead to changes in individual propensities to group under the umbrella of various- page 5 -
family or household forms affect demographic conditions as well. These, in turn, influence the 
availability of kin thereby constraining the actual frequency of certain family and household
configurations (Wachter, Hammel and Laslett,1978; Wachter et al., 1999). The problem is unsolvable
except via micro simulation models which enable us to estimate and factor out the magnitude of the 
impact of changes in demographic conditions, thus leaving a ‘uncontaminated’ observed change to be
explained by the operation of exogenous factors. The first such model was proposed by Wachter  and
colleagues although a new version by Wachter (Wachter et al., 1999) has been also used. There are a
number of alternative models and alternative uses proposed by Ruggles (1987) and Wolf (Wolf et al.,
1995) which have not yet found their way into mainstream demography. We will review some of these
later in the paper. 
Micro simulation models such as these are potentially useful in a number of other context, not
just for the study of families and households. And some of our increasingly complex theories will
necessitate that we test them using a blend of observed data and micro simulation. 
This paper is a brief review of  the models and associated estimation procedures  being applied
in each of the aforementioned. In each case I will present the main features of  the models, identify how
they enable us to improve over previous models by examining the range of their testable theoretical
implications  and, finally, review the estimation procedures and associated computational technology
needed to make some headway. I hope that my main point is rendered clearly: a substantial amount of
improvement is possible but  whether we succeed in realizing it or not  will depend on our ability to
increase the complexity of our explanatory frameworks, formulate novel study designs for the collection
of new data and, last but not least, take advantage of new computer technology. The domination of
standard statistics is rapidly giving way to alternative approaches that free the analyst from the need to
invoke restrictive and sometimes unrealistic assumptions. These approaches, however, are viable only
through intensive computing applications. Simultaneously, we should be able to formulate theories 
incorporating complexities that heretofore could not be reflected in the models designed to test them.
Since I am not the first to make this point (see Burch, 1999; Hanemman, 1988; Wachter, 1987),  I am
not solely responsible for issuing an assessment that could turn out to be wrong.- page 6 -
2. Economic versus ideational theories of fertility
 Although the final conclusion of the Princeton fertility study has been recently challenged in at
least one country and attributed to incomplete data and faulty modeling (Galloway et al., 1994), it still
stands out in the form of a negative sweeping generalization: a significant fraction of the total decline of
fertility in Northern and Western Europe during the period 1870-1930 was not due to measurable
social and economic transformations, as the conventional demographic transition theory would have it.
The observation that fertility levels as well as the pace of decline tend to cluster along regional, ethnic
and language boundaries prompted the inference that changes were driven by a diffusion mechanism
whereby regional, cultural and language barriers could sometimes offer resistance to a wave of change
or, vice versa, precipitate further changes. 
Whilst the idea that diffusion may drive the process of fertility decline is quite reasonable and
attractive, it was never well formulated, that is, the mechanisms through which diffusion was supposed
to operate were never spelled out with precision. Further, testing of this weakened version of the
hypothesis was rarely done directly and instead proceeded via a residual test, e.g., what could not be
explained by measurable (“structural”) factors must be attributable to diffusion. 
In the aftermath of the Princeton fertility study the field experienced the fierce and rigid
opposition between two explanatory frameworks. One reduced fertility behavior to the outcome of
rational decision making by individuals seeking to maximize some type of utility. Although in its most
rigorous form, this framework was introduced in demography as a direct import from economics, a
much looser form had already been applied by demographers (the demographic transition theory is a
good example), and was also present in formulations apparently very distanced from the utility
maximization framework (Caldwell’s intergenerational flows is an illustration of this). The other
framework , a  much more loosely formulated one, was erected on the idea that fertility decision making
was respondent to influences from cultural factors and adherence to practices and beliefs characteristic
of ethnic, language or other groups to which actors belong. Waves of ideational  change originating in a
particular social context could sometimes (and under conditions that usually remain opaque) invade- page 7 -
other social contexts and, if adopted, could go a long way toward explaining the demise of a high
fertility regime. An example of this is the idea that ‘westernization’ is at the root of fertility changes in
some developing areas.
Nowhere is the contrast between these two frameworks more starkly formulated than in
Cleland and Wilson’s rendition (Cleland and Wilson, 1987). In this review  the authors describe the
differences between the frameworks and  mount an attack on the economic explanation showing  that
all the available evidence regarding fertility decline in developing areas point to the existence of
influences associated with ideational factors that far outweigh those associated with individual
socioeconomic positions. Whether this is the case or not is not as fundamental as the  resolution of two
key theoretical issues. First,  is it reasonable to reify these two frameworks as if they were truly
competing entities in a zero-sum game ? Second, can we conceive of diffusion or ideational processes
where a new behavior is adopted without incorporating constraints imposed by individual’s
socioeconomic positions? In my view the answer to both is negative. I will  deal with each of them in
reverse order.
a. Diffusion processes do not occur in a socio-economic vacuum.
Elsewhere  (Palloni, 1998),  I offer  a definition of diffusion processes that captures the
complexities involved in representing the mechanisms through which diffusion occurs: ‘A diffusion
process is one where selection or adoption (rejection) of a behavior or practice depends on an
individual decision-making process that assigns significant influence to the adoption(rejection) behavior
of other individuals within the social system” (see also Montgomery and Chung, 1994; Montgomery
and Casterline, 1996; Montgomery and Casterline, 1998). The  definition implies the adoption of two
important premises. First,  diffusion results from individual decision making processes and are not, as
conventionally thought, the outcome of a somewhat mindless, a-rational choice of behavior. From this
point of view the contrast between, on the one hand, a rational actor whose decision depends on prices
and individual budgets and, on the other,  an impulsive individual whose actions depend on the
operation of obscure inclinations toward or against adopting some behavior,  is a false one. Second, the
distinction between  a situation involving diffusion and another that does not is the existence (non- page 8 -
existence) of social influences, that is, effects of other’s behavior on ego’s behaviors. A key element is
thus the identification of the set of ‘significant others’ for a given individual and for a given behavior.
b. Integrating models I: sociological models 
Armed with this definition we can  translate theoretical propositions invoking diffusion process
into more or less refined models to be tested directly so that the diffusion explanation ceases to be
validated by default. There a number of ways of doing this and all involve integration into a single model
incorporating factors associated with both individual maximization calculus and social influences. For the
sake of brevity of exposition I choose to describe two models, one of sociological and the other of
economic inspiration. Unfortunately this does not do justice to the richness of this models (see also
Montgomery and Casterline, 1998; Strang and Tuma, 1993; Durlauf, 1999; Brock and Durlauf, 1995;
1999; Durlauf and Walker, 1998; Kohler, 1997) 
The first model is one of sociological inspiration. Here we  represent individuals choosing
among a set of alternative behaviors under a set of individual and social constraints. This
can be accomplished most efficiently positing the existence of a system with two states,
one representing adoption of the target behavior and the other representing adoption of a
different behavior. Subjects are allowed to move between these two states as a function of
individuals characteristics associated with social and economic conditions (costs and
utilities), external characteristics acting as constraints (or facilitators), influence of
external sources of ideas and effects of individual’s social networks. To capture the
dynamic of this two-state system we can formulate a pair of equations for the risk or hazard
of transitions between the two states:
:12i(t)=:o12(t) exp($Xi(t)+(Z i(t)+"Wi(t)G(Y(t))+gi12)
(1)
:21i(t)=:o21(t) exp($*X*i(t)+(Z*i(t)+"W*i(t)G*(Y*(t))+g*i21)
where :12i(t) is the risk of moving from state 1 (non adopter) to state 2 (adopter) for- page 9 -
individual i at time t, :o12(t) is a baseline hazard, Xi is a vector of ‘structural characteristics’
of individual i, Zi is a vector valued function containing information on external sources of
information that may influence i’s choice, Wi is a contiguity vector for individual i
containing the weight assigned to the influence of contacts with individuals j=1,...i-1,
i+1,...N, where is N is the total number of members in the system, G is a functional
transform and Y is a vector of responses for members j=1,...i-1,i+1,...N. Finally, g12i is an
error term. The second equation defines the risk of moving from state 2 to state 1
(abandoning the new behavior). It is analogous to the first but with the possibility of
different baselines, different effects, and different matrices of covariates. The contiguity
vector is time dependent  to allow for changing influences derived from social networks
during the process. Similarly,  the vectors of responses Y and Y* allow for updating of
information about members of the system.
This model confronts a number of problems. The most important one is that its nature is  t ad
hoc since there is no theoretical formulation from which one can infer or translate specific mechanisms
through which  social influences and individual characteristics  affect decision making. This problem
disappears if one chooses an economic framework.
b. Integrating models II: economic models    
Although there are other formulations involving social learning (Kohler, 1997; Montgomery and
Casterline, 1998) I summarize here an attractive  model of effects of social interactions developed by
Brock and Durlauf (1995), Durlauf (1999) and Durlauf and Walker (1998).  The appeal of this
formulation is that it effectively marries an individual  utility maximization model incorporating social
interactions with discrete choice models that are  familiar and estimable from empirical data, at least
when the system is in equilibrium. One starts with a set of actors, i=1,...,I,  in some social context; each
actor desires to maximize utility at time t from adoption (non adoption) of a behavior wit that can attain
values 1(adoption) or -1 (non adoption). Their decision depends on maximization of a function V of 
individual characteristics Xit, perceived (average) response from other actors, wt*, and unobserved
external shock, git. The fundamental steps in the formulation of the models are to posit the nature of V- page 10 -
and that of git. First, V is assumed to have a linear structure so that:
V(wit,Xit, git(wit ))= u(wit,Xit)-J/2(wit-wt*)2+git(wit)  (2)
The model is composed of  two types of utility: one is the individual utility embodied in the first
component u(.); the other is the social utility represented by the second component. This depends on a
parameter  J and a measure of social conformity (wit-wt*). When J is 0 the model collapses to a
classical individual utility maximization problem. Second, the random utility terms are assumed to be
extreme value distributed so that their difference is distributed as a logistic function. It is this assumption
that renders the model tractable via conventional discrete choice approaches. The next step in the
formulation is to solve for the equilibrium mean choice. This solution is sought by investigating the nature
of the individual probability of adopting the behavior at each point in time, given the desire of extracting
maximum utility. Asymptotically (when the number of individuals grows to be very large) it is verified
that the system may have one or three equilibria with distinct mean behaviors. Which equilibria takes
place depends on the strength of social utility and the magnitude of the bias toward one choice induced
by private utility. In environments where social utility overwhelms individual utility one is more likely to
observe multiple equilibria. The model also implies that in the presence of large social effects, small
amounts of initial changes motivated, for example, by adoption among a few forerunners, may lead to a
cascade of individual changes precipitating a rapid fertility decline.
Either model (1) or (2) implies that (a) individual decision making is not independent from social
effects and (b) that adoption behavior takes place in a setting where individual make rational decisions.
Applications of either of these models encounter similar difficulties. The first is the need for information
about decision-making on the part of other actors,  and on who among  these may be significant actors
for any ego. Admittedly, choosing a matrix of weights for others’ choices (required in model (1) but not
in the current form of  model (2)) is not a trivial matter and must be resolved theoretically. Even if
resolved though, one needs to assess such weights empirically and this inevitably entails challenging
problems for data collection. None of these models can be estimated with a minimal degree of- page 11 -
robustness without access to  longitudinal information. 
The second difficulty is that empirical estimation of the models is not simple and usually special
techniques and procedures are needed. Model (1) requires to posit the existence of individual
heterogeneity which normally leads to serious identification problems and is only solvable at the expense
of carrying out complicated integration and, at least in some cases, application of Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC). Estimation of the models derived from the more economic framework above are
usually problematic since they involve the assumption that the system has reached a steady state.
Finally, confirmatory analysis may require us to perform micro simulations as an aid to decide between
alternative feasible formulations. 
3. Individual behaviors and systemic properties
Modern demographic applications frequently focus on the following type of problem: individuals
occupy a limited number of states, i=1,...k, and transit between them according to an intensity or hazard
rate, :ij(t). For example, in the analysis of adult health we postulate the existence of a multistate system
with four states, healthy, with chronic illness, with disability and dead. A family demographer may desire
to focus on stages in the family life cycle in which case we are interested in states such as marriage and
cohabitation, divorce and separation, childbearing. Or, finally, we may wish to test theories regarding
fertility in which case one could use the equivalence between states and birth orders. In sum, an
impressive array of demographically interesting problems can be so conceptualized. Multistate hazard
models have been designed to enable us to estimate basic parameters or functions, namely, the baseline
hazard rates (the :’s)  and the effects of covariates (some fixed and some time dependent) on the
baseline hazard rates. Estimation of these models requires fairly detailed information on the timing and
order of the events, on the characteristics of individuals, and on the nature of unmeasured
characteristics. It must be said that precious little empirical research has made use of these models even
though they could yield high returns. Since the data requirements are fairly stiff, formulating the problem
at the outset as one involving multistate hazards could enable us to suggest new data collection designs
that meet the desiderata for estimation and identification of these models.
But the plain application of these procedures is not the only activity that will enrich demographic- page 12 -
analysis. There are two additional promising lines of work that analysts are beginning to study in some
detail. The first has to do with the macro implications of micro processes. Estimation of a multistate
hazard models on observed sequences of individual processes does not in itself provide information
about aggregate properties, e.g . about the net effects of the micro processes (those taking place among
individuals) on a macro level (the implied aggregate characteristics). For example, given estimates of the
hazard rates and effects of covariates from a multistate model describing health and morbidity, we may
want to know what is the implied distribution of the population by health status, by duration in each
state and by age. Anderson and May (1991) provide a complete machinery linking individual transition
rates and aggregate distributional characteristics. Billari and colleagues (1999) applied some of
Anderson and May tools in order to study the steady state characteristics of young adults that
corresponds to a particular set of rates at the individual level. These inferences, however, require the
assumption of a steady state, the existence of which is by no means assured and should be explored ex
ante Alternatively, one must focus on the dynamic of the system, that is, on the trajectory of the
aggregate system over time, as a function of evolving individual processes. This is not a trivial task
because it is frequently plagued by analytic difficulties and requires substantial computing power
The study of the relation between macro and micro processes can also provide tools for
discriminating between different micro models. Most of these models are non nested and their
relative performance cannot be assessed with conventional log likelihood ratio tests but require
Bayesian assessments (such as the use Akaike criterion or the  BIC measure) . However, it is clear that
using the macro implications of an estimable  micro-model one could assess the degree to which
observed aggregate distributional properties more or less approximate the ones directly implied by the
micro models. I have yet to see analyses where this strategy is fully deployed. Take, for example, the
estimation of a multistate model for the analysis of fertility. The models can get as complicated as we
may wish to make them but, for the sake of simplicity, let us a assume that one has a series of states
representing  n birth orders and n-1 transition rates to estimate. Estimates of the rates and of the effects
of covariates on the rates directly implies a measure of aggregate fertility, such as TFR. If the implied
value for TFR does not approximate observed TFR values, then the model is probably incorrect,- page 13 -
regardless of what the likelihood ratio or t-tests may suggest to the analyst.
There are other applications and implications as well. Consider again a multistate model for
health, morbidity, disability and mortality. This model is or ought to be the foundation for calculating
measures such as Active Life Expectancy (ALE). Yet we know that in most cases ALE estimates are
derived from cross-sectional information and one never tests for distortions induced by the fact that
what we observe currently is one of many possible stages in a dynamic process. It may be possible,
however, to adjust conventional ALE measures using micro simulation in conjunction with estimated
multistate models.
The second line of research alluded to above regards the formulation, implications and
estimation of the influence of characteristics of the aggregate system on individual decision making. This
theme is the same as the one just reviewed in the case of diffusion models for fertility but in a context
with multiple states. I will provide two examples which should shed light on the problem
a. Occupational choices and aggregate saturation
Suppose we are interested in the occupational behavioral choices of women who face  labor
markets where there are two types of occupations: female dominated and male dominated. For the
sake of illustration let us define a male (female) dominated occupation as one  where more than fifty
percent of the incumbents are males (females). The theory tells us that female’s transition rates into and
out of  the labor force is a positive function of the density of female dominated occupations, so that the
rates are higher as the  availability of female dominated occupations exceed some threshold value. This
is an example of a phenomenon where  individual behavior has an impact on the average characteristics
of the system and this, in turn, affects the structure of incentives for individual behavior. Our intuition
tells us that the system may either collapse to a unisex occupational structure or that there could be
some (one, two, multiple) equilibrium points. The type of asymptotic behavior will most likely depend
on the relative magnitude of the baseline rates and the relative magnitude of the effects of relevant
covariates on the male (female) transition rates. In some cases an analytic solution to the problem may
be available, but in most cases one will need to resort to simulation models in order to investigate the
implied dynamics of the system.- page 14 -
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b. The spread of disease in social contexts with choice of preventable behaviors
Classical epidemiology tells us that as the prevalence of an infectious disease grows, the
prevalence of the disease also increases. In the absence of retreats to immunity or of subgroups
 with very low infectivity and unconnected with groups of high infectivity, the infection will overwhelm
the population. Suppose, however, that individuals are allowed to choose a preventable behavior, such
as protected sex or vaccinations, and that the adoption of  this behavior depends on prices of adoption
and on the perceived (expected) levels of prevalence of the disease. A modified Anderson-May system
of differential equations can describe this situation (see also Phillipson, 1998):
where S(t), I(t), R(t)  are the proportions susceptible, infected and recovered (and then immune) at time
t, P(.) is the fraction demanding immunity (say vaccines), and p(t) are prices at time t. The parameters
are rates: b for births into the population, $ for  infectivity of a contact between an infected and a
susceptible individual at time t,  T for recovery into immunity, and m for  mortality rate. There are all
sorts of simplifications in this system, not the least of which is that it completely overlooks the role of
age. But for the purpose of illustration, it will suffice.
From this system, it is clear that the rate of change of I(t) is positive provide that $S(t)/( T+m)
>1. Suppose that we let actors make  decisions about whether to use the preventative behavior. The
choice can depend on a decision-making rule involving discounted streams of expected values
associated with the susceptible and infectious states, current utility in the two states,  as well as the- page 15 -
levels of prevalence and $ (Phillipson, 1998). The outcome of such a formulation is that individuals will
adopt the behavior only if prevalence of the disease exceeds a threshold value which is unobserved for
all individuals. Under an assumed (any continuous) distribution for individual thresholds, it is possible to
show that as long as  the individual response to levels of prevalence is sufficiently pronounced, the
hazard of becoming infected decreases with prevalence. This is contrary to the classic epidemiological
scenario. Similarly, to the extent that prevalence decreases to very low values, the attractiveness of
adopting the preventative behavior decreases for all individuals who are still susceptible, and this will
trigger the emergence of a new stream of infections and new increases in prevalence.  This too is
contrary to conventional wisdom in classical epidemiological models.
This scheme can certainly be enriched with a number of modifications.  For example, individuals
may not  respond to average levels of prevalence but to average levels observed or expected in
selected groups of membership. This will necessitate to define the nature of those groups for each
individual in the system. In so doing we approximate the situation faced in the study of diffusion of
fertility behavior. More complexity may be needed to apply the model to other areas of behaviors such
as residential mobility, deviant behavior, and the like.
Issues revolving around the relation between individual behavior and systemic properties are
inherent in the work of sociologists, demographers, and economists. Sociologists and demographers
have traditionally avoided explicit formulations to solve the problem whereas economists have resorted
to formulations of market mediated actions. Surely neither of these two research practices is sufficient
to deal with the complexity of social interactions.
4. Transitions and sequences in life cycle analyses
Suppose we wish to study the following type of situation: we suspect that a particular outcome
or behavior, say health status during late adulthood, H(t), depends on behaviors practiced and positions
occupied during the past. Among these positions we include types of jobs, type of family environments,
and residential choices. The theory may suggest that H(t) is not simply a function of independent effects
of all these behaviors and positions but a result of the particular sequence of positions and behaviors
followed by the individual. Another example where sequences of events acquire importance is in the- page 16 -
study of onset of family planning programs, F(t). One could argue that in order for the institutionalization
of such programs to occur,  societies must undergo a series of transitions involving, for example, the
formation of a strong central state, the resolution of the conflict of interest between state and Church,
the emergence of organized labor,  the birth of neighborhood organizations, and the formulation of
economic plans involving massive foreign credit programs. Here too, a theory may posit that early
adoption of family planning requires the passage through a particular set of stages, and that in its
absence early adoption is more difficult or impossible. Other examples can be drawn from the literature
on occupations and status attainment, retirement, and from the literature on criminal careers.
All these examples could conceivably be studied using multistate hazard models. However, it is
not difficult to show that deploying multistate hazard models could lead to intractability and/to excessive
data demands. This is because to test the theory it will not be enough to estimate effects of covariates
on the various transitions. What one needs is to estimate the effects of particular configurations of past
trajectories on a particular outcome. This can be done using time dependent covariates reflecting states
visited in the past, duration of sojourn, frequency of visits and the order of a subset of transitions. As
practitioners know well, this can  get out of hand quickly if the positions or states are more than a
handful, and if trajectories are long.
More recently a number of social scientists have begun to work on sequence analysis (Abbott
and Tsay, 1999; Abbott and Barman, 1997). The inspiration for this approach is drawn from tools
designed in molecular biology and genetics for the analysis of resemblance/diversity of protein and
DNA sequences. In particular, the applications involve the study or ordered arrays using Optimal
Matching (OM) algorithms, one of a number of alternative computing algorithms developed to study
ordered arrays in a number of different fields.
 OM algorithms rest on three key stages: coding, assessing distances, and clustering. Coding is
a theoretically driven activity to define the various states on which the analyst will focus. This will involve
decisions about lumping or splitting events and will, therefore, shape the nature of the sequences that
one will use in the remainder of the analysis. For example, one could study careers using officially
defined occupations or, alternatively, a theoretically inspired occupational classification that partially- page 17 -
lumps together some of the official categories. In the study of life cycle stages one may want to partition
the category ‘ two parent family of origin’ into two subcategories, one  with and the other without
resident grandparents. Note that it is possible to define a state so that it captures multiple states and the
order of transitions between them. For example, if one is interested in studying labor force participation,
it would be feasible to define as a state the transition from unemployed to employed, and as a different
state the transition from employed to unemployed. Timing is taken into account in simpler ways as
well, such as designing arrays where the loci are states or positions occupied on, say a particular year
(if year is the appropriate time unit).
The next step is assessing distances. This is done by generating matrix of distances between
pairs of  individual arrays. The dimension of the matrix depends, of course, on the number of cases in
the sample. In order to assess distances between arrays or sequences it is first necessary to use three
operations that can translate one array into another. These operations are replacements, insertions and
deletions. Since the arrays are strings of characters--drawn from the alphabet of states defined in the
coding stage--the distance between any two arrays can be measured by counting the minimum number
of replacements,  insertions or deletions of characters necessary to transform one array into the other.
For example, the strings LAZIO and MILAN require a minimum of two replacements to be identical (a
maximum of five is ordering of the sequence is relevant), whereas the strings LAZIO and
FIORENTINA requires 5 insertions (or deletions) and two replacements (five if order is relevant). But
not all replacements and insertions or deletions may be equally important from a theoretical point of
view. In order to let these operations have theoretical meaning it is necessary to define a matrix of
weights or costs so that certain operations are more heavily taxed (and mean more in terms of distance)
than others. This weights must be chosen by the investigator and should be derived from theory rather
than being arbitrary. At this stage computing intensive technology comes in: the assessment of distances
depends on the application of computer algorithms involving a very large number of operations and, in
some cases, one needs to resort to  approximation techniques, such as Gibbs sampling, in order to get
solutions.
The final stage of OM algorithms is the analysis and utilization of the distance matrix, D.- page 18 -
If this is a N x N matrix, it will define N (N/2-1) observed non-redundant distances between the sample
arrays. At this point one attempts to reduce the dimensions of the observed distances into a smaller
number of  typical distances. This can be done displaying a number of  classification algorithms, such
as cluster analysis. In the end, we will be able to map an N(N/2-1) dimensional space into, say,  a K
dimensional space where, hopefully, K<N/(N/2-1). These K distinct distances (or, more precisely,
clusters of distances) are produced by a reduced subset of the N possible sequences. Sequence
membership in clusters of sequences is a discrete variable that can be used to explain outcomes or as
an outcome to be explained by other factors.
OM algorithms and the entire skeleton of sequence analysis is the object of intense scrutiny and
much skepticism (Wu, 1999). The required intensive computation at the second stage of the OM
algorithm is an obvious problem. But the Achilles-hill of OL is the definition of the cost matrix:  how can
one define a non-arbitrary cost matrix? And how sensitive are final analyses to changes in this matrix?
An important issue here is that apparently identical replacements may mean different things and different
weights ought to be assigned to preserve such differences. Thus, from a theoretical point of view it is
not the same to move from unemployed to employed than to move from employed to unemployed (Wu,
1999). Yet, if these are treated as sequences the assessment of distances involves symmetry and the
two will be treated alike. Finally, the reduction of the distance matrix using clustering algorithms is
another step where arbitrary decisions may influence the analysis and cause lack of robustness.
Clustering algorithms are notorious for their sensitivity to a priori specified rules of clustering.  Although
it is too early to say what the pay off of this methodological approach will be,  it is worth exploring and
developing further since, in theory at least,  offers solutions for testing theoretical complex formulations
that are intractable with extant models and procedures.
5. Matching problems
The marriage problem is well known to demographers. It involves understanding the rules that
regulate the matching of males and females in a marriage market. What we normally observe are
frequencies of matches already made and frequencies of unmatched individuals. Each member of the
pair in a match and each unmatched individual possess relevant characteristics such as age, education,- page 19 -
race, etc...More rarely we may observe the dynamic of match making over time, with individuals
entering a union, remaining without partners or dissolving the union. In either case the problem is to
identify how individual’s preferences for partners, for remaining unmatched, or for disrupting a union
operate to render the set of observed matches or couples at any point in time.
Job searching and employment are also match-making phenomena. In this case employers seek
and attempt to hire workers and workers seek and attempt to get offers from employers. And, here
again, what we frequently observe is a cross sectional set of matches (and non-matches) and, more
rarely, the evolution of the  job-searching and job offering process.
Finally,  intra-family transfers from, say, children to parents (and vice versa) 
is another example of a process whereby individuals attempt to establish a contract so that each
member of a partnership makes a commitment to the other to supply services, emotional support,
income or to secure access to assets. This particular example, however, introduces a new complication
since, by and large, parents confront not one child but several children who may cooperate (or
compete) among themselves. Thus, one of the partners in this exchange is a collectivity wherein second
order processes may be occurring, namely, siblings may bargain amongst themselves to coordinate the
supply of transfers to their parents.
Up until recently the marriage problem as well as the problem of intra family transfers have been
approached in rather ad hoc ways, using conventional multi variate techniques that identify the strength
of selected individual characteristics on the probabilities that such an individual enters a match. Typically
one does not  know the context in which choices were made since we have no information on the pool
of potential ‘partners’ available at the time. Therefore, it is difficult to infer individual preferences for one
cannot distinguish them from the degree of availability of desirable matches. These approaches are
usually atheoretical or based on very loosely formulated theories, and overlook the fact that in all cases
the formation (non-formation or dissolution) of a match involves confrontation of two, not one, 
individuals who make decisions about the gains (losses) associated with each potential match. 
In contrast, job search theory in economics uses a rigorous theoretical framework, with explicit
formulation of individual preferences and explicit decision-making rules according to which individuals- page 20 -
may decide to form a match or continue searching among a set of potential preferred partners.
However, except for rare situations where one normally knows the availability of desirable matches,
application of these frameworks is also limited by the same difficulty mentioned above, namely that of
discriminating preferences from availability.
In a recent paper devoted to the study of matching between employers and workers,
Logan(1996) proposed a Two Sided Logit (TSL) model to estimate the effects that individual
preferences have on the observable worker-employer matches. The key element of the procedure is to
replace the unobserved choices available to one side in the match by estimates of the preferences of
individuals on the other side. These estimates are retrieved from a cross section of matches where there
is limited information on employers and/or employee characteristics. In a recent extension of the 
procedure  Logan and colleagues (Logan et al., 1999) tackle the marriage problem when one has full
information on individual characteristics that enter in their decision making process. In what follows I
will illustrate the main features of the approach for the case of marriage.
One starts from the proposition that a male i has a preference for women j that depends on a
limited set of her characteristics, say Xj. Analogously, man j has preferences for remaining single
(choosing partner j=0) that depend on his characteristics, Xio. The same applies for a woman j. The
second proposition is that these preferences can be expressed as utility functions that translate a
preference into a (not discounted) utility for each actor. This imply the existence of four equations
representing the ith  man’s utility derived from a woman j and from staying single, and the utility of
woman j derived from man’s i and from staying single:
Uij="Xj+gij
Uio="Xio+gio
(4)
Vji=$Yi+gji
Vj0=$Yjo- page 21 -
where Uij is the utility derived by man i from woman j who possesses characteristic Xj, Uio is the utility
derived from man i from remaining unmatched, " measures the strength of preference and gij and gio
are continuous independent and identically distributed errors. The symbols in the last two equations
have analogous interpretations for woman j. The main idea is that men and women proceed to rank
potential partners (including staying single) while attempting to maximize their utility. Given a single draw
of error terms, each man can order his preferences regarding all women available. The same applies to
women. The X’s and Y’s (as well as the " and $) may be scalars or vectors.  Under these conditions
the problem is equivalent to a two-sided matching model, well known in economics, and  which can be
shown to have a fundamental property: there is always a stable state of matches in which no man could
find a partner whom he would prefer and who would also prefer him over any other man,  with the
same holding for women. This property is fundamental for estimation is possible only if one assumes
that the observed set of matches is a stable set. This is not as strong assumption as it may sound since it
only requires that the stability be transitory, subject to variation as new people enter into the market and
when characteristics change. All is needed is that matches be the result of voluntary decisions, not that
they be unchanging as individual preferences or characteristics change. However, the uniqueness of this
stable set of matched requires the assumption of complete utility transfers and may not hold when there
are constraints on both side of the match on the transferability of utility (Buder and Wright, 1994).
The advantage of this formulation over the more simplistic ones available in the standard
literature on the subject is that the match making process takes into account the preferences of
individuals on one side of the match,  and the constraints on availability imposed by the preferences of
individuals on the other side of the match.
The objective of an empirical analysis is to retrieve estimates of " and $ from an observed set
of matches. This is done utilizing the TSL model which can be reasonably implemented through
application of MCMC methods, a technique through which one can approximate the ‘true’ value of  
parameters governing complex probability distributions. 
Can this procedure be applied to other areas in demography? With some simplifications, one
could certainly study intergenerational transfers between parents and children. These have been the- page 22 -
object of study by economists with  utility maximization frameworks (see for example Lillard and Willis,
1995; 1997) but neglecting the issue of availability noted above, except in an ad hoc manner. The first
step to apply the model is to redefine who the actors are: parents can be treated as a one side of the
exchange and each child in turn (or all children or a combination of them) as the other side of the
exchange. The second step is to define what the matching involves. It could be living arrangements, or
monetary support or the supply of services or a combination of all of these. The third step is to
formulate an explicit model for preferences that takes into account characteristics of the parents and
children and the hypothetical weights (preferences) assigned to these characteristics by each side of the
exchange. The final stage is to start from the assumption that the observed configuration of transfers is
indeed a stable set and then proceed with the MCMC estimation algorithm. 
This set up is not devoid of difficulties. Thus, the fact that transfers are two-sided, in the sense
that children provide for parents after parents have invested in children, poses the problem that the
latter type of transfers, if they occurred at all, took place in the past and are, for all purposes,
unobserved. That is, the observed flow of transfers from children to parents may be a function of past
(unobserved) transfers from parents to children. The second problem is that the true nature of the
process surely involves bargaining among children themselves and these are thoroughly masked by a
reduction of one side of the match to a single actor. 
These difficulties that may plague applications of  TSL to the study of intergenerational transfers
and, no doubt, to other areas where its use could be advantageous, do not detract from the fact that
TSL is a reasonable approach for the study of phenomena that have been heretofore  intractable.
6. Micro simulation models
Micro simulation models have been around demographers for a long time but their uses have
been limited to the study of fertility (Ridley and Sheps, 1966; Wood and Weinstein, 19xx; Larson,
19xx; Barrett, 1971), evaluation of family planning programs (Inoue, 1977), and  specially to evaluation
of kin availability (Wachter et al., 1999a; 1999b; Ruggles, 1987; Wolf et al., 1995). These micro-
simulation models have also been proposed as refined tools for performing more accurate population
projection (Land, 1986; Wolf, 1999; Nakamura and Nakamura, 1978). More recently Wachter,- page 23 -
Knodel and Van Landingham (1999b) suggest ways in which micro simulation models can be used to
assess the impact on kin availability for the elderly in countries such as Thailand that have been affected
by HIV/AIDS. Wolf and Laditka (1996) propose their applicability to studying issues related to active
life expectancy.
In order to understand the main properties of these simulation models, it is convenient to
introduce a simple example. Suppose one desires to study the process whereby individuals are subject
to transitions to and from a limited number of states, say health, chronic illness, disability and death.
One starts with an initial or jump-off population distribution by state, usually obtained from secondary
data sources or as a result of applications of the micro simulation model itself  to data describing
transitions in the past. After deciding on an appropriate time scale, the initial population is subjected to
the hazard or risk of transitions characterizing the states initially occupied by individuals in the
population. These hazard rates are estimated from empirical data or, if projecting into the future, they
must reflect the investigator’s belief in their future values. Once the hazard rates are identified, transition
probabilities are calculated and a waiting time is imputed to each individual by selecting a random
number, R, from the unit closed interval. The hazard rates and the probabilities are sequentially applied
from the  first until the final interval of time, say the Kth interval. In the nth interval of time (n<K) there
are two decisions to be made for each individual:
a. Does the individual experience the transition from state i to state j (j=1,2,...i-1, i+1,...S)?
If the transition rate from state i to state j￿i in the nth interval is constant and equal to :ij(n), the
probability of experiencing the event is given by hij(n)=1-exp(:ij(n) *(n)),  where *(n) is the width of
the interval. A random number R1 is drawn from an unit interval and one decides that the individual will
move from i to j if R1<=hij(n). 
b. If the event occurs, what is the waiting time?
If the individual moves from state i to state j one must decide the associated waiting time. A
second random number is drawn, R2, and the waiting time in the nth time interval, )<*,  is calculated
as - page 24 -
) = ln (1-R2 hij(n))(:ij(n))-1
Since individuals will normally be exposed to a number of competing risks--corresponding to
each of the feasible transitions out of the state currently occupied--these two decisions ought to be
made for all competing transitions. If, as a result of the calculations, an individual is scheduled to
experience several events, one choose the one with the smallest associated waiting time. It immediately
follows that the frequency of an event, say moving from state 1 to state 2, is calculated aggregating the
individual events instead of being, as it happens in macro simulations, the expected number of events in
the time interval.
These calculations are applied to each and everyone of the K intervals over which the
investigator decides to follow the process. In the end, it will be possible to calculate indicators
characterizing the multistate process such as, for example, the mean number of times that an individual
visits state j, the distribution of individuals by state at the end of the process etc...
If a  Monte Carlo simulation is performed, the calculations are repeated a large number of
times, large enough to be able to calculate approximate distributions for the indicators of interest. This is
important for it allows the investigator to assess measures of central tendency as well as of dispersion of
the distribution, thus enabling one to associate a measure of uncertainty to the calculations.
Unlike micro simulations, macro simulations are designed to calculate expected number of
events within each interval thus neglecting the inherent randomness at every time step and rendering
impossible the calculation of variances or of other measures of dispersion that reflect randomness. This
is a key property distinguishing micro from macro simulations. 
A second important feature of micro simulation models is that one can make the state space as
complicated as one needs to without running into constraints associated with number of observed
frequencies. This is because, as long as one is able to estimate the rates for each pair of transitions, it
will be always possible to estimate the frequency of associated events in an arbitrary initial population.
In contrast,  in macro simulations this is frequently not possible since the estimation of probabilities for a
given path of events is made difficult or impossible when the number of cases to which such path is- page 25 -
applicable is too small. Said otherwise, in a micro simulation model the probability measure associated
with a given path of events is a result obtained at the end of the simulation, whereas in a macro
simulation such probability must be known in advance before obtaining results.
A third property of micro simulation models is that one can introduce individual heterogeneity,
measured and unmeasured. Measured heterogeneity is taken into account by defining different rates for
individuals with different characteristics such as age, social class, cohort etc...Unmeasured
heterogeneity is taken into account choosing for each individual an adjusting factor for each transition
rate. Typically one defines a probability distribution to characterize such unmeasured adjusting factors
and, in each time step and for each transition rate to which each individual is exposed, we randomly
draw adjusting factors and then inflate (deflate) correspondingly the rate  before calculating waiting
times.
Macro simulations cannot take into account individual heterogeneity (except only as averages)
and the scope for measured heterogeneity is limited since, once again, the  number of cases in each a
priori defined category (age, cohort, social class) may be very small thus compromising the stability of
the rates.
This machinery is,  in principle at least, not overly complicated. It allows representation of
processes with many individuals, complex state spaces, measured and unmeasured heterogeneity, and
even with stochastic versions of parameters. In addition, micro simulations of kin can also establish and
retrieve kin and cognate relations between individuals in the simulated population thus permitting us to
examine the effects of variability in demographic rates on the distribution of the population by kin types.
These properties make simulation suitable for population projections, for projection of kin frequencies,
for the study of kin frequencies in hypothetical demographic regimes, for the study of long term
properties of complicated multi state models, for the study of emergence of behaviors that depend on
individual membership in social networks, etc... The range of applications is truly formidable. 
But there is no free-lunch. Indeed, micro simulations do have limitations. The
first and perhaps most important shortcoming  is that one must rely on a typically large set of 
parameters, some of which may not be known or estimated  at all and must be guessed. The advantage- page 26 -
of micro simulation in this case is that one can assess--although this is rarely done--the degree of
sensitivity of the simulation results to different specification of the unknown parameters.
In addition to a large set of parameters, micro simulations necessitate a jump-off population
which is usually estimated from sample data. These data may be subject to sampling errors and may
contain missing information that one must impute before proceeding.
Finally, the implementation of micro simulation rests on computer programs that are long and
complicated,  and where the opportunities for hidden errors (‘bugs’) abounds. I am not referring here
to code errors that result in glaring inconsistencies. I am speaking of code errors that are subtle because
they distort calculations only if a set of  conditions occur but not at all when those conditions do not
apply. The only way in which such errors can be detected  is performing costly and time consuming
validation tests that investigators are rarely willing to undertake (for an exception to this rule see
Wachter et al., 1999b)
A final shortcoming that plagued micro simulations models in the past twenty years was
associated with the storage capacity and computer speed limitations inherent in the available computer
technology of the time. This is,  I think, no longer a relevant obstacle.
7. Summary and conclusions
I have reviewed the development of approaches suitable to test new and more complex
demographic theories. The review illustrates the point that demographers have made substantial
progress in the sense that simplistic theories have been abandoned and replaced with more precise,
albeit more complex, theoretical formulations. 
Models translating these new theories and procedures to estimate these models have also
evolved in the direction of increasing complexity but their implementation are demanding new and more
data--particularly longitudinal observations--and, not trivially, vast amounts of computer power, in
terms of both speed and storage capacity.  Indeed, rapid changes in computer technology may, for a
while at least, drive progress in the modeling and testing front of research and these, in turn, will
facilitate the formulation of newer and bolder theories.
I doubt that the progress experienced in the past ten years is a blip in an otherwise irregular- page 27 -
landscape of very slow and gradual improvements. I venture to say that in the  near future the unusually
rapid developments that I reviewed here will be multiplied several times, completely transforming the
way we do demography and social sciences in general.References
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